Institutions are a major field of interest in the study of development processes. We contribute to this discussion concentrating our research on political institutions and their effect on the non-income dimensions of human development. First, we elaborate a theoretical argument why and under what conditions democracies compared to autocratic political systems might perform better with regards to the provision of public goods. Due to higher redistributive concerns matched to the needs of the population democracies should show a higher level of human development. In the following we analyze whether our theoretical expectations are supported by empirical facts. We perform a static panel analysis over the period of 1970 to 2003. The model confirms that living in a democratic system positively affects human development measured by life expectancy and literacy rates even controlling for GDP. By analyzing interaction effects we find that the performance of democracy is rather independent of the circumstances.
Introduction
Since Sen (1983 Sen ( , 1988 Sen ( , 1991 Sen ( , 1999 Sen ( , 2000 Sen ( , 2003 , we are aware of the fact that development is a very encompassing and broad concept. Development as a whole depends on each individual's capabilities. Capabilities define the freedoms to choose a valuable life in accordance with individual preferences. This approach inspired the emergence of a pluralist and integrative conception of "human development" and its operationalization in the form of UNDP's Human Development Index. It is not only income, but also health and education that enable people to shape their lives in line with their desires.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the contribution political institutions can make to enhance human development.
Political institutions are an appealing topic of research as they organize social, economic and political life. Hence, an obvious question would be what kinds of institutions do this job best. From an ideological perspective, democracy seems to be the right political system because at the end of the day, its beneficiaries are politically free as well as they are free to take decisions about their lives. Therefore, democracy is also considered an end of the development process and a piece of the puzzle of the more comprehensive picture of human development (Sen 1999a : 147-159, Sen 1999b , Sen 2000 . But whether democracy indeed has a positive impact on economic and human development is not a trivial question -neither from a theoretical nor from an empirical perspective.
With regard to theory, three major debates are circling around the instrumental value of democracy for economic development:
First, there seems to be a controversy concerning the contradictory effects of property rights protection and redistribution in a democracy on growth and well-being.
There might be a trade-off between growth-enhancing property rights protection and equalizing, market-correcting redistribution. On the one hand, property rights protection is a necessary condition for an increase in the overall wealth of a nation (Ace-moglu/Johnson/Robinson 2001 , 2002 . But whether all members of this nation can benefit from it highly depends on redistribution as well. On the other hand, the probably adverse effects of redistribution on the savings rate, growth and the labor market and the related effects on the overall living standard of the population including non-income human development come to mind. Moreover, in democracy, corporatism may lead to lock-in effects and a decreasing reform capacity. This danger, together with the fact that elites in democracies tend to produce inefficient policies supports positions like the Lee-Hypothesis 1 . These positions state that autocratic regimes are the more efficient systems to tackle market failures, to stimulate economic growth and as a consequence to improve human development (Alesina /Rodrik 1994 , Barro 1996 , Acemoglu/Robinson 2008 .
A second debate revolves around causation: Is democracy cause or consequence of the development process? A third field, which is linked to this second point, is a range of discussions that focus on factors that impede or foster democratic systems to work well. It is not obvious what the conditions are under which democracies will display a positive effect -given they are supposed to have one. Examples of these enhancing or impeding factors are the level of economic development itself, inequality, country-specific and historical factors, education and social fragmentation (Lipset 1959 , Barro 1999 Empirical research studies give no clear answer to the above questions. Persson and Tabellini (2006) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) show that in case of economic growth the efficiency argument in favor of autocratic regimes does not withstand empirical
1
The hypothesis that authoritarian rule is beneficial to economic growth was named after the former president of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew (Sen 1999b: 5) .
investigations. Others, on the contrary, find a moderately negative or nonlinear relationship between democracy and growth (Barro 1996 , Tavares/Wacziarg 2001 , Minier 1998 ). When studies focus on redistribution, i.e. the effect of political systems on income inequality or on the provision of public goods and the size of the public sector, results are less ambiguous (Boix 2001 , Gradstein/Milanovic 2004 , Persson 2002 , Stasavage 2005 , Persson/Roland/ Tabellini 2000 . In general, they support the view that redistribution might be higher under a democratic regime. But if this is the case, the question still remains whether this redistribution is beneficial to economic and nonincome human development.
Concerning the non-income dimensions of human development, there is again uncer- and not interacted with some institutional measure.
In this paper, we want to extend the latter strand of research in the following ways: First, we theoretically discuss why democracy is supposed to have a positive impact on human development. Linked to this field of interest is the question whether democracies, besides their intrinsic importance for the development process, fulfill a constructive and instrumental role giving people the opportunity to express, to form and aggregate their preferences and thus to steer public action in an efficient and effective manner (Sen 1999: 157) . Particularly, we base our argumentation on the redistributive aspect including public goods provision, not the property rights aspect of democracy.
We argue that with respect to the quantitative as well as to the qualitative dimension of redistribution and public goods provision, any democracy will perform better than an otherwise equal autocracy; thereby, we rely on implications of the median voter theory and arguments provided by Sen. Although redistribution is often seen as a disturbing factor leading to inefficiencies, we want to clarify why it is redistribution in democracies that makes a difference in non-income human development outcomes compared to autocratic regimes. We also empirically try to find evidence of whether living in a democratic or an autocratic political system makes a difference in the level of education and health, which we take as proxies for non-income human development.
Second, we theoretically identify and empirically investigate the prerequisites for the functioning of democracy as such with respect to the provision of public goods and services that foster human development. 2 This allows us to account for heterogeneity in human development across democratic regimes.
Third, we include the time dimension of the data and all countries on that data is available into our empirical analysis to fully exploit all the information which is available.
In the upcoming section 2, we attempt to clarify why redistribution is the major angle in investigating the relationship between political institutions and human development. Furthermore, we will point out why there should be quantitatively higher and qualitatively better redistribution in democracies. Subsequently, we will discuss why this might only be true if certain other factors are present such as a certain level of 2 Consequently, we do not try to explain democratization but the dependence of democracy's performance upon other factors once it is in place.
education, economic development, inequality or unity in the population. In section 3, we will examine whether there is empirical evidence for this relationship. First, we estimate the distribution of life expectancy and literacy for selected years. Second, we perform a panel analysis of a more sophisticated model including interaction effects between democracy and the main determinants of its functioning.
Our results indicate that democracy is favorable for human development even after controlling for the level of economic development. But contrary to the theoretical reasoning there is no clear evidence for the factors that according to the literature are supposed to influence democracy's performance. It seems to be democracy itself -rather independent from the circumstances -which has a positive effect on human development. It is in particular remarkable that democracy's performance seems not to depend on a certain level of economic development.
The Political Economy of Democracy and Human

Development
The following remarks serve to clarify the relationship between political institutions and human development. Recurrence on institutionalist theories provides a link from political institutions to the living standard of the population. This link is given, foremost, by the redistributive policies an institutional system produces. The median voter theory predicts that democratic systems are characterized by a higher level of redistribution than autocracies. Consequently, the median voter theory gives insights into the quantitative dimension of redistribution. Arguments provided by Amartya Sen capture the qualitative part of redistribution and permit to extend the median voter theory by stating that democratic institutions make redistribution more responsive to the needs of the society, i.e. that redistribution translates into a public spending for transfers, goods and services that increase the wealth of the society. To complete our theoretical discussion, we address the issue that the fulfillment of the predictions made by the median voter theory and Sen depends on several requisites that influence any democracy's performance.
How can political institutions influence human development?
Institutions attract a lot of attention in the mostly interdisciplinary studies of dif- With regard to institutions, the existing literature leaves the impression that there is not enough precision concerning the term "institution" itself. There is a big use of performance indicators measuring the extent to which certain institutional systems function, e.g. when it comes to political stability or governance issues (Gradstein/Milanovic 2004: 516 (Persson 2002: 886) . The common output of institutions and preferences are policies. Although actors and other environmental constellations may change over time, policies in general will reflect the political institutions that produced them (Persson/Tabellini 2006 : 321, Peters 1999 .
We distinguish between two types of policies that may be favorable to human development: policies for the protection of property rights and policies for redistribution.
Policies for the protection of property rights encourage economic investment and contribute to economic development and economic growth (e.g. Acemoglu/Johnson/ Robinson 2002). Growth is assumed, under certain conditions, to increase the welfare of the population by reducing poverty (Klasen 2004) . Policies for redistribution have an equalizing impact on the distribution of wealth in a society. Especially through broadbased programs and the provision of public goods and services, market failures shall be compensated and normative, social optima be achieved. The matching of society's and an individual's needs with an adequate redistribution scheme and an appropriate public provision of goods and services provides a more direct link between political institutions and human development than property rights protection. Of course, one might argue as we already mentioned in the introduction that there might be a trade-off between growth-enhancing property rights protection and equalizing, market-correcting redistribution. Nevertheless, the focus of this paper will be on policies with a redistributing character which aim at better health and education for the population as a whole and especially for those groups -the poor -who would otherwise have only limited access to these goods as these are not sufficiently provided by markets.
If we assume that via these channels policies will affect the level of human development, if we especially focus on redistributive policies and moreover, if policies mirror the political system in which society is steered according to certain political decisions, then the following question emerges: Which political systems are more appropriate to produce market-correcting redistributive policies that will additionally match the needs of society and therefore will advance human development?
The answer is democracy. Democracy is conceived as a political system whose structures and procedures permit the rule of the people. Of importance are free and repeated elections, political competition, rule of law, political and civil liberties. These component parts frame public debate and deliberation that deal with the management of society. Carrying forward our reasoning, democratic political systems are assumed to be the most appropriate systems to ensure a redistribution that fulfills societal demands. 5 Although redistribution from the rich to the poor and vice versa exists in both autocratic and democratic systems, the following theoretical arguments make us believe that redistribution from the rich to the poor is more pronounced and set at a higher level in democracies. 6 One of the most famous theoretical arguments is the model of Meltzer and Richard (1981) . The median voter hypothesis states that in democratic governments the median voter is the decisive voter. The more his income falls short
5
Democracies are considered to perform best on both dimensions: property rights protection and redistribution. Whether the one or the other is more important depends on people's preferences and the formal and informal face of the considered democracy.
6
See for example Gradstein and Milanovic (2004) for an empirical study finding evidence for this linkage.
of the average income of all voters, the higher the tax rate, i.e. redistribution he will decide. Therefore, government spending should be larger and social services more extensive in democratic regimes -if the majority of the voting public lives at the bottom of the income distribution and only a small part enjoy richness (Keefer/Khemani 2005: 2) .
In contrast, in authoritarian systems, the distribution of wealth does not play a decisive role. All or a substantial part of the electorate is excluded from the decision-making process, and this is precisely to avoid the redistributive consequences of democracy.
As a result, the average size of the public sector remains quite small (Boix 2001: 2) although there are examples of autocracies with a commitment to a relatively large public sector and universal well-being.
The fact that there is more redistribution in democratic regimes does not mean that redistribution is aligned with societal demands. In other words, voting alone does not solve the aggregation problem resulting from different individual preferences. Thus, a second question related to the qualitative dimension of redistribution emerges: Why are democratic governments more responsive to the needs of the citizenry compared to autocratic ones? According to Sen (1999a Sen ( : 157, 1999b ), democracy -behind its "intrinsic" value -is of eminent importance for the process of development because of the "constructive" and "instrumental" role it plays in the formation and aggregation of values, needs and preferences and their translation into well-designed policies benefiting the society. Political and civil liberties -for example those related to free speech, public debate and criticism, as constituent parts of a democratic regime -permit the formation of preferences and values as well as access to the relevant information. Consequently, a better understanding of societal needs is possible. Democratic procedures then facilitate the transmission of these needs into the political arena where decision power is distributed amongst legitimate representatives of the society as a whole.
The latter means that otherwise disadvantaged groups, whether they are minorities or a broad mass of poor people in a developing country, get a voice and the opportunity to be heard and However, in the "pursuit of political objectivity" and through the facilitation of "public reasoning", democracy not only helps to construct policies that are matched to the needs of its citizens (Sen 2004: 9) . It is also instrumental and protective because control mechanisms such as free and repeated, competitive elections and the compliance with the rule of law principle reduce discretionary and corrupt behavior of those representatives who hold political power. Democracy provides the incentives to create responsibility and accountability that induce political-administrative leaders to listen and to act on behalf of the society they represent (Sen 1999a : 147ff., Sen 1999b .
In an autocratic regime a usually small, ruling elite dictates the will of the people from above. This is frequently accompanied by a repression of the political opposition and the prohibition of free expression and opinion impeding the conceptualization of the volonté générale. The state apparatus is (mis-)used in favor of the welfare of the ruling elite. Political measures with a redistributing character increasing the welfare of the bottom quantiles of society are implemented not because of institutional structures but either due to ideological reasons and/or to a level that will help autocrats to remain in power and to increase their own wealth (Olson 1993 , McGuire/Olson 1996 .
Responsiveness, representation, accountability and the selection of competent political and administrative staff thus are uncommon in autocratic regimes (Besley/Kudamatsu 2006: 313f.). Summarizing, whereas democracies quantitatively and qualitatively perform better than autocracies in terms of redistribution, there is no clear relation between inequality and societal needs on the one hand and redistribution on the other hand in autocracies, except for those, generally socialist ones, with a special commitment to universal welfare. In general, this leads to a lower level of human development in autocratic systems.
represented. In cases of direct democracy or democracy at a local level, these groups even decide for themselves.
What determines public service provision especially in democracies?
The formal existence of democracy does not guarantee that it functions in the idealized manner described above. Democratic regimes might display a lot of heterogeneity concerning the benefits for human development. This is the case when certain factors impede or enable that the relationships predicted by the median voter theory or Sen's theory can be observed. These factors then hamper or foster the performance of democracy with regards to the satisfaction of societal needs. Problems could arise if for certain reasons -located either at the agenda setting, the policy formulation, the implementation or evaluation phase -the allocation of public expenditures is inefficient. Our approach to explain heterogeneity in any democracy's performance follows the suggestion by Keefer and Khemani (2005) and hence differs from other studies that focus more on the pre-conditions for democracy or democratization (e.g. Lipset 1959 , Glaeser/Ponzetto/Shleifer 2007 . 9 Following our theoretical reasoning, the necessary timing of the presence of the respective factors is treated here as simultaneous. Their interaction with democracy at one point in time influences the output, the policies in form of public goods' provision, and the outcome, the level of human development.
First, as redistribution and the provision of public goods depend upon the fact whether there is anything to redistribute and to invest in public goods, the performance 8
Because poor people are highly dependent on public action as they cannot invest their own (nonexistent) private resources, they suffer the most from ineffective government in terms of redistribution and service provision (Keefer/Khemani 2005: 1) .
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We do not consider the question whether a country has to be prepared for democracy or whether it is a democracy which lifts the country up to a certain level of development. In contrast to Sen (1999: 4) we do not follow his statement: "A country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it has to become fit through democracy." of a democratic system will be the better the higher the level of economic development is. So the positive effect of democracies on public goods provision will be intensified by the level of economic development.
Second, if citizens are ill-informed, this may lead to insufficient participation, which would be necessary for public reasoning and the expression of 'qualified' needs'. As a result, the quality of responsive government manifesting itself in policies that reflect society's demands and needs decreases. Moreover, accountability suffers from information constraints because voters cannot control politicians' behavior. Education 10 is one of the important factors 11 as it has a potential to alleviate any information problem.
Education in this context is not taken as an intrinsic component of human development that we want to explain, but as a means to human development. It is not only in itself a precondition for a higher living standard because it positively affects earnings, health and so on. It is also found to be a requirement for democracies to develop and to persist. Moreover, one can suppose that education leading to conscientious participation raises the quality of democracy. The latter may come to the fore in a more efficient and effective provision of public goods (Lipset 1959 Social fragmentation can be another factor disturbing the functioning of a democratic system measured by the public goods it provides. Research has found that social
10
We leave out cultural factors here as they are hard to measure. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) emphasize the people's values as equally important as socioeconomic resources and civil and political rights. According to these authors, culture provides the link between economic development and democratic freedom. Without certain values like "human autonomy" or "self-expression values", fostering a priority on self-made choices, human development might not be possible (Inglehart/Welzel 2005: 286f) . Moreover, such values are dependent upon a certain level of socioeconomic development. We assume, although this is to be questioned, that the more education people have the more enlightened they are and the more freedom they demand to live the life they value.
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Other factors might be a well developed media sector and accountable and institutionalized parties that overtake political education tasks (see Keefer/Khemani 2005: 5-9) . But it can be easily argued that without a certain level of broad-based education, a media sector will not develop because of a lack of demand (for the role of the media see Besley and Burgess (2002)). The same is supposed to hold for the institutionalization of parties and accountability issues. The last factor that is in line with the quantity-redistribution argument is income inequality, characterized by a distribution of income where the median income is much smaller than the average income. 12 Hence, the majority of people live at the lower bound of the distribution whereas only a few benefit from being rich. The reasoning behind the effects of inequality on human development can be twofold. First, such income inequality can induce inequalities in human development because in more unequal societies, less people can afford to live a healthy life and to spend their money on education. This effect should even be higher in autocracies where service provision according to our argumentation does not function well. Democratic political systems should compensate the negative effect of income inequality. The higher the income inequality, the larger the distance of the median voter's income to the average income. Following the median voter hypothesis, more redistribution will be demanded. Thus, along with a higher income inequality, the redistribution effect of democracy increases. Public service provision will be at a higher level that may result in better human development outcomes.
12
The argument that the median voter is farther away from the mean when a society is more unequal is true for right-skewed distributions. This is usually the case for the national income distributions, which are quite close to log-normal distributions.
Summary and Working Hypotheses
Summarizing the theoretical arguments above, we can state that democratic regimes in comparison to autocratic ones are expected to produce a higher rate of redistribution and thus to higher public expenditures. Additionally, public spending priorities in democracies reflect the needs of the society more than do the ones in autocracies. Execution of public budgets will be in those sectors where public demand is most obvious.
Moreover, democratic control mechanisms will assure the implementation of policies so that a high degree of compliance with laws, directives and orders is reached. Hence, public action can translate into the desired human development outcomes, for example a better health status of the population or a lower illiteracy rate. But the performance of democracies will vary according to the specific circumstances. We assume that the level of income, education, social fragmentation and the level of income inequality all affect the level of the provision of public goods and human development in a democratic system. Therefore, the following general hypotheses can be derived: a) Democratic political systems will yield better results in human development than autocracies, independently from the level of economic development.
b) The positive effect of democracies on public goods provision will be intensified by the level of economic development.
c) The positive effect of democracy on human development will be higher, the higher the level of education in a society.
d) Social fragmentation lowers the positive impact of democracies on human development. The more socially diverse a country is the more difficult it is to provide broad-based services even in democracies.
e) The redistribution effect of democracy compensates the negative effect of income inequality on human development. Furthermore, the higher the level of inequality, the bigger the positive effect of democracy on human development.
3 Empirical Links between Democracy and Human Development
Empirical Implementation
To quantify human development, we focus on the non-income components of UNDP's
Human Development Index and consequently use UNDP's data on life expectancy at birth and on literacy rates. Life expectancy at birth is measured in years, whereas the literacy rate is an index value ranging from 0 to 100. We choose education and health as both aspects are direct determinants of capabilities and as they both influence the freedom to choose the kind of life one likes. Education as well as health raises productivity and the ability to convert income and resources into the favored way of life (Sen 2003: 55) . The third dimension of human development, namely income, is not of interest for this paper, since detailed literature on the relation between democracy and economic development is already available. Our data on political institutions, especially on democracy, is taken from the Polity IV Project of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. This dataset includes the Polity2 score as Democracy variable ranging from 10 (highly democratic)
to -10 (highly autocratic), while a zero score indicates a state between autocracy and democracy which we consider as not being democratic. 
15
Gini coefficients are not available for every year. We therefore use a simple moving average between available observations to complete the dataset.
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The ethnic fractionalization measure renders the probability that two individuals selected at random from a population are members of different groups. It is calculated with data on language and origin using the following formula
, where s ij is the proportion of group i = 1, . . . , N in country j going from complete homogeneity (an index of 0) to complete heterogeneity (an index of 1). For more details see Alesina et al. (2003: 159f.) .
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According to Alesina et al. (2003: 160f ) the assumption of stable group shares is not a problem as examples of changes in ethnic fractionalization are rare. At least over the time-horizon of 20 to 30 years, time persistence can be assumed.
in our panel analysis for life expectancy but neglected in the analysis of literacy itself.
As our additional control variables we consider as most important whether a country experienced some conflict in the period under observation and whether a high percentage of population is suffering from HIV/AIDS. To measure war, we take data from the UCDP/PRIO intrastate conflict onset dataset, 1946-2006. We choose the variable warinci2 (War ) that measures the incidence of intrastate war and is coded 1 in all country years with at least one active war.
18 For HIV/AIDS, we take adult ( Unfortunately, the available data on public expenditures were not sufficient for our purposes. Such data would have enriched our analysis as we could have examined the channels that democracy takes to affect human development. We suspect that democracy causes different priorities in public expenditures compared to autocracies.
Therefore, increases in public expenditures on health and education can be decomposed into two components: an increase due to higher total expenditures and an increase due to different priorities in government spending. While the first source is mainly driven by economic growth, we expect democracy to be a main driver of the second source.
As mentioned above, we were unable to gather sound data for relative government spending for the given period. Only for the more recent years does the Government
18
War is defined by more than 1000 battle deaths. As intrastate wars are more frequent than interstate wars, we decided to take the intrastate war variable.
Finance Statistics of the IMF include sufficient information concerning these issues.
Thus, neither the public expenditures' path of causation nor the channel of private spending can be investigated here due to data restrictions. We must therefore rely on the theoretical argumentation that underpins our empirical analysis.
Descriptive statistics
First, it is worthwhile to take a look at the densities of life expectancy and literacy for democracies and autocracies separately (Figures 1 and 2 ). We use kernel density estimators for this purpose and apply boundary corrections at 0 and 100 for the literacy rate and at the minimum and maximum values for life expectancy. While in democracies, both for life expectancy and literacy the mass of the distribution tends to the right hand side, there seems to be a group of autocracies with a low level and another one with a high level of life expectancy and literacy each. The same pattern can be observed in Tables 7 to 14 To define the groups of low, middle and high life expectancy or literacy rates we computed quantiles of life expectancy and literacy. The income groups are defined according to Holzmann, Vollmer and Weisbrod (2008) .
not, they display lower life expectancies and lower literacy rates than their democratic counterparts.
Panel Analysis
In a simple model, we try to explain life expectancy and literacy with our measures of democracy controlling for GDP. GDP is lagged for one period to reduce the apparent problem of endogeneity. Additionally to the measuring of democracy and economic development, we include the literacy rate as a proxy of the population's ability to articulate their needs in the political arena, to control politicians' activities and as a proxy of the population's priority for private spending on education and health.
We also lag literacy for one period to reduce endogeneity problems. We only include education and its interaction with democracy in the model with life expectancy as our dependent variable. In line with our theoretical reasoning, we incorporate the lagged Gini coefficient to measure the effect of income inequality and ethnic fractionalization as a proxy for social fragmentation.
As pointed out, all variables describe conditions which potentially hamper or foster the functioning of democracy in terms of addressing the needs of the population. Thus, we are interested in their interaction with democracy on the one hand. On the other hand, we want to know whether they have an effect on human development independently from the political system. Following Cronbach (1987) 20 , we center the variables which are used for the modeling of the interaction terms over the cross-section to deal with problems of multicollinearity.
Furthermore, we add a set of dummies for global regions 21 as well as year dummies to all regression. The region dummies should capture much of the geographical, political
20
See also Jaccard et al. (1990) .
21
Following the World Bank definition.
and historical heterogeneity across the world. The inclusion of period effects allows us to capture overall upward trends in literacy and life expectancy that for example could be explained by technological improvements (Pritchett/Summers 1996: 846) .
Moreover, we control in both regressions for war, because it destroys lives as well as infrastructure for the provision of health and education services. Additionally, we control for HIV/AIDS in the life expectancy regressions. The AIDS dummy variable is interacted with the year dummies because HIV/AIDS was more of a problem for the more recent years in the sample and less in the earlier ones. A socialism dummy aims to capture heterogeneity across autocracies and an egalitarian tendency in those regimes.
We estimate the model for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 (and the preceding five year periods), as both literacy rate and life expectancy are not updated annually but roughly every five years, while being interpolated in the other years. Pre-estimation diagnostics indicate that heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation have to be dealt with. We therefore find the estimation of our model with a cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with panel specific AR(1) to be the most appropriate, addressing both issues simultaneously (stata command: xtgls).
In case of life expectancy, we run separate regressions for non-OECD countries and the entire sample. There is a strong positive and highly significant correlation between our measures of human development and democracy in merely all specifications (we will discuss the one exception below). The coefficients of the other main explanatory variables carry the expected signs and are highly significant, except for the Gini variable, which has an insignificant sign in most cases. The coefficient of GDP per capita is positive, the literacy rate has a positive coefficient in the life expectancy regressions (remember that it is not included in the regressions where literacy is the dependent variable), and fractionalization carries a negative sign. All these results are robust to the choice of the democracy measure; they hold both for the fraction of democratic years (demexp) and the average Polity2 score (mpol).
When it comes to the interaction effects of democracy with GDP per capita, ethnic fractionalization, inequality and literacy respectively the results are rather ambiguous.
The interaction of GDP and democracy sometimes carries a positive sign and sometimes a negative sign depending on the measure of democracy and the countries included in the sample. In fact, it is insignificant in most cases. We conclude that there is no robust evidence for this interaction and thus the democracy's performance seems to not depend on the level of economic development. A similar argument holds true for the interaction of inequality and democracy. It is positive and significant in the life expectancy regressions when the socialism dummy is not included and it is not significant when the socialism dummy is included. Thus, its effect is fully captured by the socialism dummy 22 In the literacy regression, the Gini interaction effect is only
22
Indeed, inequality is higher in socialist autocracies with a on average higher life expectancy and literacy than in other autocracies.
significant for one of the two democracy measures (demexp) and thus not fully reliable.
Contrary to the median voter prediction, it carries a negative sign in this case. The interaction of democracy and literacy is only significant for mpol and not for demexp.
The interaction of democracy and ethnic fractionalization is significant in the life expectancy regressions for the full sample; it carries the expected negative sign. For the sample of non-OECD countries, it is only significant when demexp is used as measure of democracy, both for literacy and life expectancy. Hence, there is more support for this interaction effect in the data than for the others, but it is still rather weak and not robust to different measures.
Overall, there is only weak evidence for any of these interactions. The specifications excluding interaction effects are therefore the more valid and reliable ones. This might also explain why there is no significant effect of democracy on literacy in the model including mpol and all interaction effects. Summarizing, it can be said that a democracy's influence on life expectancy and literacy is positive and robust but does not depend on the circumstances.
Conclusion
We believe that our study has its associated merits explaining the linkage between democracy and human development. In our theoretical section, we clarified the causal channels of democracy influencing human development. In contrast to earlier studies, which put their focus on property rights, we emphasized the importance of the redistributive effects and effects of public goods provision in democracy. However, we can be less certain that the influence comes directly from a democratic system. Question remains whether it is driven by other social and political factors, which are very well proxied by democracy. Against the background of democracy, other factors might be at work as well. Future studies could incorporate social capital as well as the degree of decentralization of the political-administrative system. In addition, it would certainly be an improvement of our analysis to empirically identify and model the channels that democracy takes before it affects human development, for example via the public expenditures. Unfortunately, the data for this endeavor have not been available.
Theoretical expectations about the concise conditions interacting with democracy in the creation of a healthy and literate society have not been met. We found only very little evidence for conditions and requirements that increase or decrease the impact of democracy on human development. The interaction of democracy and its other presumed conditions of functioning turned out to be insignificant or not robust to different democracy measures or samples. One could therefore conclude that the functioning of democracy -in terms of non-income human development improvements -is rather independent of GDP per capita, inequality, education and also ethnic fractionalization.
The missing robustness of our interaction effects does not permit any inferences.
Nevertheless, GDP per capita, education and ethnic fractionalization influence nonincome human development levels directly. A high level of economic development and education is related to a high level of non-income human development. High social fragmentation, on the contrary, leads to lower levels of non-income human development.
Income inequality has rather ambiguous results and turns out to be insignificant in most cases.
To sum up: It is democracy itself that is important and to a smaller extent the circumstances under which it occurs. This stands in contrast to what theoretical literature has told us. However, it can be considered as good news for promoting democracy in poor, fragmented or uneducated societies. We can derive two main conclusions from our analysis. First, democracy is good for human development, independently from the level of economic development in a country. Second, even if the picture here is more ambiguous, the positive impact of democracy on human development seems to be rather independent from the circumstances. Since income inequality did not play a major role in our estimations we found no supporting evidence for the median voter theory.
Nevertheless, as democracy positively affects the well-being of a population, the main question of this paper deserves an affirmative answer. We thus cautiously support Sen's argument stating that democracy fulfils its "constructive" and "instrumental" role. 
